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ARTICLE 
MARRIAGE EQUALITY COMES TO AMERICA 
Carl Tobias 
Marriage equality is sweeping the nation. Four appeals courts 
recently affirmed district judges’ opinions which invalidated 
numerous state laws proscribing same-sex marriage. Yet, the 
Sixth Circuit reversed a number of district jurists, prompting a 
circuit split that provoked Supreme Court resolution. Because 
marriage equality’s status is unclear, this piece assesses 
disposition of the litigation and recommends how to clarify 
marriage equality.   
I.  RECENT LITIGATION 
United States v. Windsor1 prompted new challenges2 in all 
states prohibiting same-sex marriage.3 The case held that the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) violated the Constitution4 by 
harming dignitary, economic, and numerous related interests of 
same-sex couples and their children.5 The majority praised 
                                                     
  Williams Chair in Law, University of Richmond. Thanks to John Pagan and 
Peggy Sanner for ideas and Leslee Stone for processing. Remaining errors are mine. 
 1. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).    
 2. Many cite it. For analyses of marriage equality, see MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM 
THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR (2013); MARK SOLOMON, WINNING MARRIAGE (2014).  
 3. See Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of 
Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 870–71 (2014); Heather Gerken, Windsor’s Mad Genius, 
95 B. U. L. REV. 587 (2015). The ACLU has filed many of the challenges, but so have local 
attorneys. See Steve Friess, For Lawyers, a Rocky Walk Down the Gay Marriage Aisle, 
BLOOMBERG.COM (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/features/2015-01-
28/for-lawyers-a-rocky-walk-down-the-gay-marriage-aisle (reporting on the differing 
strategies of national organizations like the ACLU and local attorneys with respect to 
challenging same-sex marriage bans).  
 4. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2696; Michael Klarman, Windsor and Brown, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 127, 127 (2013).   
 5. It apparently used elevated scrutiny. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2693–96; see Franklin, 
supra note 3, at 872. 
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federalism without addressing state bans.6 In dissents, Chief 
Justice John Roberts asserted that the Court did not rule on the 
proscriptions’ constitutionality,7 while Justice Antonin Scalia 
claimed the arguments that invalidated DOMA could analogously 
govern them.8  
Twenty-six district courts have found bans unconstitutional; 
two affirmed restrictions.9 Four circuits upheld invalidations; all 
determined that bans contravened the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits mainly relied on the Equal 
Protection Clause’s “classification” thread, and a concurring jurist 
asserted that bans comprised sex discrimination; the Fourth and 
Tenth Circuits partly used this Clause’s “rights” strand10 but 
mostly employed the Due Process Clause’s fundamental right to 
marry.11 In October, the Court denied Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth 
Circuit certiorari petitions.12 However, last November, the Sixth 
Circuit found bans are constitutional, and this January, the 
Justices granted review.13  
II.  SIXTH CIRCUIT LITIGATION 
In March 2014, Eastern District of Michigan Judge Bernard 
Friedman considered a ban violative of equal protection because 
Michigan articulated no “conceivable legitimate state interest.”14 
                                                     
 6. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2694–95; see Gerken, supra note 3.  
 7. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2696 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting); see Klarman, supra note 
4, at 158. 
 8. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2697 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Franklin, supra note 3, at 
870.  
 9. ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, LOVE AND THE LAW: FEDERAL CHALLENGES TO STATE 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE BANS (2015), available at http://www.afj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Federal-Marriage-Equality-Report-4.22.15.pdf. 
 10. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 654–72 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing equal protection 
jurisprudence holding that classifications based on race and gender are subject to 
heightened scrutiny); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 467–68 (9th Cir. 2014); id. at 485–90 
(Berzon, J., concurring); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 375–78, 384 (4th Cir. 2014); 
Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1222–24 (10th Cir. 2014). The “rights” strand of the 
Equal Protection Clause applies strict scrutiny reviewing laws affecting suspect 
classifications. 
 11. Bostic, 760 F.3d at 375–78, 384; Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1208–22.   
 12. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Declines to Review Same-Sex Marriage Cases, 
Allowing Unions in 5 States, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 6, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-declines-to-review-
same-sex-marriage-cases/2014/10/06/ee822848-4d5e-11e4-babe-
e91da079cb8a_story.html135 S. Ct. 134 (2014); Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Delivers Tacit 
Win to Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2014, at A1. 
 13. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S.Ct. 1040 
(2015); Adam Liptak, Justices to Decide Marriage Rights for Gay Couples, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
17, 2015, at A1.  
 14. DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 768 (E.D. Mich. 2014). He found misplaced 
reliance on Windsor, which said marriage laws “must respect the constitutional rights of 
persons,” and its citation to Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), was an enormous 
disclaimer. Id. at 770–72. 
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Last year, a Kentucky district jurist held a ban contravened equal 
protection,15 while Ohio16 and Tennessee17 courts invalidated 
limitations that prohibited recognizing out-of-state marriages.  
Each defendant appealed,18 and the Sixth Circuit overturned 
rulings which struck down bans.19 Judge Jeffrey Sutton first 
pointedly invoked Supreme Court precedent and declared that 
Baker v. Nelson was binding until reversed explicitly or by 
outcome.20 The jurist propounded several ways to conceptualize 
plaintiffs’ appeals — “Originalism; rational basis review; animus; 
fundamental rights; suspect classifications; evolving meaning” — 
yet rejected  the plaintiffs’ theories for constitutionalizing 
marriage’s definition and removing the issue from state voters 
where it has been “since the founding.”21 
He proclaimed that every Justice commences analysis of 
constitutional phraseology by assessing how ratifiers understood 
the wording.22 Doctrine yielded the same conclusion as history.23 
Judicial restraint and the idea of the sovereignty of “the people” 
dictate that courts uphold strictures evaluated under the rational 
basis test if jurists “conceive of [. . .] any plausible reason” for 
them.24 “[S]ome rational basis” must justify the traditional 
definition; Sutton posited two bases that hurdled this low bar.25 
One was states’ need for regulating “natural effects of male-female 
intercourse: children[,]” and the “encouragement to create and 
maintain stable relationships” in which they flourish.26 Another 
was desire “to wait and see” before changing a norm accepted for 
centuries.27 He asserted that the Justices have mainly invalidated 
                                                     
 15. “No conceivable legitimate reason” justified it. Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 
536 (W.D. Ky. 2014). 
 16. It violated equal protection and due process. Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036 
(S.D. Ohio 2014).  
 17. It contravened equal protection. Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. Tenn. 
2014). 
 18. Erik Eckholm, One Court, 3 Judges and 4 States’ Gay Marriage Cases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2014, at A15. 
 19. DeBoer, 772 F.3d 388; Erik Eckholm, Court Upholds 4 State Marriage Bans, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2014, at A1.  
 20. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 399, 402 (citing Baker v. Nelson, 469 U.S. 810 (1972), that 
summarily dismissed a marriage case). 
 21. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 403. 
 22. The Constitution’s government limits are an “unbending bulwark [until] the 
people” revise it with Article V, so the “Fourteenth Amendment permits [. . .] States to 
define marriage” traditionally. Id. at 403–04. 
 23. Id. But see William Eskridge, Original Meaning and Marriage Equality, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 17, 2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/01/symposium-original-
meaning-public-deliberation-and-marriage-equality-2. 
 24. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 404 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 25. Id. But see infra text accompanying notes 38–39. 
 26. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 404–05.  
 27. Federalism allows “laboratories of experimentation,” permitting diverse state 
approaches. Id. at 406. 
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under rational basis scrutiny novel laws that target groups for 
disfavored treatment.28 Bans could not evince the unthinking bias 
or malice that the Fourteenth Amendment proscribes, as 19 states 
constitutionalized a widely-held norm already in law.29 Sutton 
lauded citizens for altering judicial decisions through 
constitutional revision.30  
Regarding the plaintiffs’ argument, the jurist asked if 
individuals have a fundamental right to marry that is “deeply 
rooted in [U.S.] history and tradition” and “implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice 
would exist,” were they sacrificed, and contended the test is 
often met by locating the “right in the Constitution,” which has 
no general or gay marriage right.31 He said equal protection 
demanded heightened review of laws which single out groups of 
persons for unequal treatment, but the Justices and the Sixth 
Circuit have never held that sexual preference classifications 
mandate elevated scrutiny.32 To determine whether a particular 
classification is suspect and presumptively unconstitutional, 
courts apply four “rough” criteria.33 Sutton could not deny the 
“lamentable reality that gay” individuals have experienced 
discrimination yet also claimed the “marital institution arose 
independently” of the record compiled, spanning millennia and 
nearly all societies.34 He observed plaintiffs wielded political 
power that 11 years of success and the promising future 
witnessed.35  
                                                     
 28. Id. at 408 (citations omitted). 
 29. Id.; Linda Greenhouse, It’s Too Late to ‘Wait-and-See’ at the Supreme Court, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/30/opinion/on-same-sex-marriage-
its-too-late-to-wait-and-see-at-the-supreme-court.html.  
 30. “Debate on sensitive issues [. . .] may shade into rancor[,] but that does not justify 
removing [them] from the voters’ reach. Democracy does not presume that some subjects 
are either too divisive or too profound for public debate.” He found “real” persons on both 
sides of each initiative, while gay people and states should not be considered abstractions. 
DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 409–10 (citing Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 
S.Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014)).   
 31. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 411 (citation omitted). Loving found a “fundamental right to 
marry” but used no new definition to allow interracial marriage. Id.; DeBoer, 973 F. Supp. 
2d at 768. But see Franklin, supra note 3, at 887; infra note 64. 
 32. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 413; Klarman, supra note 4, at 141. But see supra text 
accompanying note 10.  
 33. Whether government discrimination historically victimized the group and it has 
a defining characteristic legitimately bearing on the classification; exhibits unchanging 
characteristics defining it as a discrete group; and is politically powerless. DeBoer, 772 F.3d 
at 413 (citation omitted). 
 34. “Laws targeting same-sex couples” are recent. This sequence prevented 
inferring “prejudice against gays” prompted marriage’s traditional definition. Id. at 
413 (citation omitted); see Peter Baker, Millenia of Marriage Between Man and Woman 
Weigh on Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2015 at A16.  
 35. States need not recognize marriages others conduct. The 14th Amendment 
demands laws only be rationally related to legitimate ends; insisting on states’ own 
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Judge Martha Craig Daughtrey, writing in dissent, criticized 
Sutton’s notion that the Fourteenth Amendment’s “original 
meaning” left marriage untouched, contending it was also not 
originally meant to end public school segregation or anti-
miscegenation laws.36 Daughtrey also criticized Sutton’s view of 
marriage as an institution meant for male-female relationships, 
claiming there was never a universally accepted definition.37 The 
jurist characterized the argument that prohibitions satisfy 
rational basis review because same-sex couples produce no 
unintended children as so weak it “could not be taken seriously.”38 
To the majority’s “let the people decide” assertion, Daughtrey 
countered with the difficulty of amending state constitutions and 
contended the U.S. Constitution requires courts to determine 
“individual rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,” despite 
public opinion.39 Regarding the majority’s admonition that the 
states should be allowed to “wait and see” marriage equality’s 
impacts elsewhere before changing the definition, Daughtrey 
replied that, with no clear evidence of problems, the “states as 
‘laboratories of democracy’ metaphor and its [restraint pitch do not 
have] resonance in the fast-changing” marriage debate.40  
Each plaintiff quickly appealed, with every jurisdiction 
save Tennessee filing before the deadline to facilitate review 
and supporting certiorari.41 That enabled the Justices to first 
discuss the petitions on January 9, grant them a week later, and 
resolve the question this Term.42 
                                                     
marriage definitions is rational. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 415, 417–18; Greenhouse, supra note 
29 (success idea). 
 36. Racial discrimination remained following a civil war, slavery’s termination, and 
14th Amendment ratification, so many cases and court decrees were required to achieve 
any protection. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 431 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). 
 37. His admiration for strikingly unequal traditional marriage was “naive, if not 
misplaced.” Id. at 432; see Douglas NeJaime, Will the Supreme Court Recognize Modern 
Marriage?, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2015, available at http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-
oe-nejaime-same-sex-marriage-20150123-story.html.  
 38. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 434 (citing Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 656 (7th Cir. 
2014)).  
 39. The Supreme Court said the people cannot order states to violate equal 
protection. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 435.  
 40. The states with marriage equality equal those with interracial marriage when 
Loving issued. Id. at 435–36. 
 41. E.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 2014 WL 6449712 (2014); 
Henry v. Hodges, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 2014 WL 5907570 (2014); see Lyle 
Denniston, Momentum Builds for Review of Same-Sex Marriage, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 2, 
2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/12/momentum-builds-for-review-of-same-sex-
marriage. Reversal and appeal unsettled marriage equality. 
 42. Lyle Denniston, Same-Sex Marriage: A Simple Appeal, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 17, 
2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/same-sex-marriage-a-simple-appeal; see supra 
note 13.     
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III.  SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The October certiorari denials suggested the Court would only 
accept cases upholding bans like the Sixth Circuit issued.43 
Marriage equality’s unsettled status and other appellate courts’ 
persuasive analyses of relevant questions demonstrate the 
Justices correctly afforded certiorari and need to reverse the Sixth 
Circuit opinion. Most important, the Court action will probably 
end the circuit split 44 that imposed diverse legal regimes and 
uncertainty on 21 million Sixth Circuit residents and even more 
across the increasingly peripatetic country.45 This stark 
nationwide patchwork, having marriages valid for numerous 
states and illegal within quite a few, greatly affects the daily lives 
of “real” persons for whom Sutton voiced deep respect.46 The 300 
same-sex couples who exchanged vows between the time Judge 
Friedman decided and when his opinion was stayed comprise 
trenchant illustrations, as the Sixth Circuit reversal leaves their 
marital status ambiguous.47 Denial of the Fourth, Seventh and 
Tenth Circuit certiorari petitions and stays for jurisdictions — 
especially Alaska, Florida and Kansas — also propel into “legal 
limbo” untold numbers of same-sex partners.48  
Additional rationales for granting certiorari directly address 
arguments for rejecting Supreme Court review. For example, the 
Justices might have preferred that state legislatures and the 
people decide the issue jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction, thus honoring 
federalism, as Windsor and Sutton urged;49 deferring to each, like 
Sutton’s Schuette allusion proposed;50 or minimizing the 
controversy which putatively attends the Court’s nationwide 
resolution of divisive social policy matters, namely abortion.51 
                                                     
 43. See sources cited supra notes 12, 42.     
 44. Id.; see David Herzig, A Taxing Decision, SLATE, Jan. 22, 2015. 
 45. See supra note 41; Ginnie Graham, 3200 Same-Sex Couples Marry, TULSA WORLD 
(Jan. 18, 2015), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/ginniegraham/ 
more-than-same-sex-couples-marry-in-oklahoma-in-less/article_dd39267c-093f-5d13-a675-
734b11637659.html.  
 46. See DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 409–10; see also supra note 30 (Sutton’s respect). 
 47. They and 1000 Utah couples won recognition cases. Caspar v. Snyder, 2015 WL 
224741 (E.D. Mich. 2015); Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192 (D. Utah 2014). 
 48. See sources cited supra notes 9, 12, 45. They will be in limbo until the Court rules. 
Even if it upholds bans, judges will probably recognize their marriages. See supra note 47. 
Alabama Supreme Court resistance to federal court rulings invalidating its ban is unique. 
Ronald Krotoszynski, Alabama’s Dangerous Defiance, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2015, at A29. 
 49. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 398 (4th Cir. 2014) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting); 
Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1231 (10th Cir. 2014) (Kelly, J., dissenting); supra text 
accompanying notes 5, 24, 27, 29, 31, 36. 
 50. See supra note 30; see also Baker, supra note 34 (discussing the idea of deference).  
 51. Klarman, supra note 4, at 146–48; see Adam Liptak, Taking Up Gay Marriage, 
But on Their Own Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2015, at A4. Insofar as this reflects concern 
about resolution before the U.S. reaches consensus, states that have marriage equality 
equal those with interracial marriage when Loving issued. See supra note 40. 
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However, Windsor intimates that civil rights’ vindication eclipses 
federalism;52 Schuette merits nominal deference because the case 
implicates affirmative action, an unrelated facet of Equal 
Protection Clause jurisprudence;53 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment contemplates that federal judges will ascertain 
whether bans contravene the provision.54 In short, the Justices 
appropriately granted review, as myriad persons now need 
clarification of their marital status, and protracted disposition will 
continue harming same-sex couples and their children and prolong 
uncertainty.55  
Numerous paths sustain marriage equality, although 
confining the appeals to a pair of questions and the Court’s 
phrasing left unclear whether a majority would adopt one. For 
instance, some commentators expected the Justices would ask if 
the bans deny claimants equal protection or due process, rather 
than (1) “does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to 
license a marriage between two people of the same sex” or (2) does 
that proviso compel a jurisdiction to recognize such a marriage 
when “lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state?”56 
The Court may employ reasoning similar to Windsor’s, as 
Scalia predicted,57 because no convincing argument distinguishes 
the circumstances. Moreover, Windsor said that individual rights 
trump federalism even with respect to marriage, which the states 
traditionally regulated.58 For example, the Justices can invoke 
elevated scrutiny and conclude that the dignitary, financial, and 
other injuries that same-sex marriage bans exact violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment.59 A related circumscribed approach, 
derived from Windsor and the second question, is having 
jurisdictions recognize same-sex marriages which are valid in 
numbers of states permitting these unions.60 The Court might also 
                                                     
 52. Bostic, 760 F.3d at 379; Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1228; supra text accompanying note 
14; see supra notes 5, 8, 45, 47. But see supra text accompanying notes 6, 30.  
 53. Bostic, 760 F.3d at 379; supra text accompanying notes 14, 39, infra note 52. But 
see supra note 30.  
 54. See supra notes 14, 39 and accompanying text. 
 55. Chaos in Alabama, Michigan and Utah resembles concern about political chaos 
invoked to support deciding Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see supra text accompanying 
notes 45–48. 
 56. 135 S.Ct. 1040 (2015). It may mean little. Robert Barnes, A Question on the Gay 
Marriage Question, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2015; Liptak, supra note 51. But see Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
 57. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
 58. Bostic, 760 F.3d at 379; Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1228; supra text accompanying note 
52; see Franklin, supra note 3, at 871 n.248; supra notes 5, 8, 39, 51, 54. But see supra notes 
6, 21–22, 30.  
 59. Klarman, supra note 4, at 158; supra text accompanying notes 4–5. But see supra 
text accompanying notes 32–35. 
 60. See supra note 56. Windsor required the federal government, not states, to 
recognize the marriages. 
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use Equal Protection Clause assessment that considers bans to be 
sexual orientation discrimination, triggering heightened review.61 
For instance, the Justices could decide limitations fail to meet 
elevated scrutiny because the “responsible procreation” and “wait-
and-see” rationales are not sufficiently important government 
interests or the heterosexual-only classification lacks a 
substantial relationship to their achievement.62  
Should a Court majority believe those avenues unpersuasive 
or require excessive doctrinal change, it may prefer relatively 
different, ostensibly narrower, routes. The Justices might treat 
bans as sex discrimination vis-à-vis equal protection, which 
receives intermediate scrutiny, because the proscriptions facially 
classify according to sex and are premised on gender stereotypes.63 
For example, the Court may find prohibitions do not survive 
that evaluation, as the reasons proffered are insufficiently 
important state interests or the pertinent classification bears no 
substantial relationship to attaining them. Moreover, the 
Justices can apply Due Process Clause examination by 
acknowledging same-sex couples’ fundamental right to marry, 
which demands strict review.64 For instance, the Court might 
determine bans fail this test, because the rationales are not 
compelling or the classification lacks narrow tailoring to their 
realization. The Justices may concomitantly hold that bans 
infringe liberty which due process encompasses, as Windsor and 
Lawrence v. Texas suggested.65 In the end, numerous paths 
support marriage equality.66  
                                                     
 61. See supra text accompanying note 10 (7th & 9th Circuits mostly used equal 
protection). But see supra note 32. 
     62.     They may even hold bans lack a rational basis. See 4th, 7th, 9th, 10th Circuit 
majority opinions, supra note 10. But see 4th, 10th Circuit dissents, supra note 10; supra 
text accompanying notes 24–29, 32–33.  
     63.    Latta, 771 F.3d at 485–90 (Berzon, J., concurring); see Suzanne Goldberg, Risky 
Arguments in Social Justice Litigation, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 2087, 2109 (2014); Adam 
Liptak, Gender Bias Issue Could Sway Chief Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2015, at A14; 
Baskin, 766 F.3d at 654–72; Latta, 771 F.3d at 467–68; id. at 485–90 (Berzon, J., 
concurring); Bostic, 760 F.3d at 375–78, 384; Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1222–24.  
     64.     See supra text accompanying note 11 (recounting the 4th and 10th Circuits’ use 
of due process review). But see Bostic, 760 F.3d at 385 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting); Kitchen, 
755 F.3d at 1230 (Kelly, J., dissenting); DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 411.  
       65.     Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2689, 2692–93; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566–67, 578–79 
(2003); see Franklin, supra note 3, at 881–89; Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. 
L. REV. 747 (2011).  
      66.     Most doctrinal tests seem met. David Cruz, Unveiling Marriage Equality?, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 17, 2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/01/symposium-unveiling-
marriage-equality; Eskridge, supra note 23. Gay rights cases may eschew them. Franklin, 
supra note 3, at 871–72, 881; see Laurence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” 
That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004).  
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Marriage equality has come to 37 jurisdictions, but not yet all. 
When the Supreme Court addresses this question, it should clarify 
marital status by ruling that bans violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
 
